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Abstract—Given the large adoption and economical impact
of permissionless blockchains, the complexity of the underlying
systems and the adversarial environment in which they operate,
it is fundamental to properly study and understand the emergent
behavior and properties of these systems. We describe our expe-
rience on a detailed, one-month study of the Ethereum network
from several geographically dispersed observation points. We
leverage multiple geographic vantage points to assess the key
pillars of Ethereum, namely geographical dispersion, network
efficiency, blockchain efficiency and security, and the impact of
mining pools. Among other new findings, we identify previously
undocumented forms of selfish behavior and show that the
prevalence of powerful mining pools exacerbates the geographical
impact on block propagation delays. Furthermore, we provide a
set of open measurement and processing tools, as well as the data
set of the collected measurements, in order to promote further
research on understanding permissionless blockchains.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the recent years, permissionless blockchains have
enjoyed rapid growth and gathered remarkable interest. Per-
missionless blockchains enable cryptocurrencies and other dis-
tributed applications based on smart contracts that promise to
revolutionize the current payment methods with the ambition
to eliminate the need for banks or other centralized entities
acting as trusted mediators of financial operations.
At the core of most permissionless blockchains lies a con-
ceptually simple protocol, such as the Proof-of-Work (PoW)
consensus proposed by Nakamoto [1], which specifies the rules
on how the blockchain should grow and converge. Despite this
simple core mechanism, real-world permissionless blockchain
deployments such as Bitcoin [1] or Ethereum [2], are ex-
tremely complex systems composed of several modules and
protocols whose properties are intrinsically hard to understand.
To further complicate matters, not all implementations follow
the specifications, while different clients have different default
parameters [3], [4].
Additionally, permissionless blockchains have long evolved
from a plain organization composed of individual miners, to
an ecosystem dominated by mining pools. At the time of
writing, the top four mining pools have around 60% and
70% of Bitcoin’s and Ethereum’s total network capacity —
the top permissionless blockchains — respectively [5], [6].
Finally, they rely on a large code-base that includes different
implementations (and versions) of the software that blockchain
nodes and clients run. It is fundamental to see how they
behave, what works, what doesn’t work and opportunities for
improvement.
Recent work has performed measurement studies of popular
permissionless blockchains [7]–[10]. Together, these studies
have contributed to a better understanding of how these
intricate large-scale systems perform in practice, unveiling
some findings that were not originally anticipated [7]–[10].
Still, the general picture attained by these studies is inaccurate
and incomplete. This is mostly due to some key limitations:
(i) relying on a single observation point, therefore neglecting
how the geographical distribution of the network affects such
measurements [7], [8]; (ii) not considering the recent predom-
inance of mining pools as first-class components in today’s
blockchain landscape [7]–[9]; (iii) ignoring transaction commit
time and how it can be negatively impacted by network delays,
out-of-order transactions and empty blocks [9], [10].
In this paper, we describe our experience and lessons
learned on implementing and deploying a measurement in-
frastructure across different continents, addressing some of
the limitations of previous studies. We focus on the Ethereum
blockchain, the second most valuable cryptocurrency.
We implemented and deployed a measurement infrastructure
consisting of several especially modified Ethereum nodes
placed across different continents. Our measurement nodes run
an instrumented variant of the Geth open-source implementa-
tion of Ethereum clients. Each measurement node can connect
to the main network and collect the desired measurements
from the transactions and blocks it observes. We analyzed
long-running measurements acquired by four measurement
nodes which were deployed in North America (NA), Eastern
Asia (EA), Western Europe (WE) and Central Europe (CE).
We highlight the following key results of our study:
• We identify the generalized and consistent practice of dif-
ferent forms of selfish behavior that harm the throughput
of the main blockchain. To the best of our knowledge,
these practices were not documented and/or not empiri-
cally studied systematically before.
• We confirm that the geographical location has a relevant
impact on block reception times and that the prevalence
of powerful mining pools exacerbates such effect.
• We provide empirical evidence that the standard 12-block
confirmation rule of Ethereum may not provide the strong
probabilistic guarantees on block finality that are usually
assumed in literature.
• We confirm that some of the metrics collected by previous
works still present the same values and report relevant
changes to other such metrics.
Our main contributions are the following:
• A one-month study of the Ethereum network from several
geographically dispersed observation points
• A set of open-source measurement and processing tools
that allows other researchers to reproduce our observa-
tions and/or perform similar studies in other blockchain
systems
• The collected data set which might enable other re-
searchers to do other findings in our collected data or
refine our observations1
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. §II
describes our measurement infrastructure and methodology.
§III presents the main results of our study, while §IV pro-
vides essential related work. §V describes the lessons learned
from our results and proposes lines for mitigating the major
threats that our study identified. Lastly, §VI draws our final
conclusions.
II. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe our methodology. Recall that our
goal is to assess the emerging behavior of Ethereum according
to several key aspects, namely: the impact of geographical
dispersion, network efficiency, blockchain efficiency, security,
and the impact mining pools have on each of these. To achieve
this, we created a modified Ethereum client that collects the
metrics of interest and deployed it over three continents. We
used Geth version 1.8.23 as the basis for our measurements.
The rationale behind choosing Geth in favor of the other
available client implementations is that Geth is Ethereum’s
reference implementation and the most widely used client,
with more than 74% of the user share [11]. The client
was instrumented to capture and log all incoming network
messages, hence allowing us to collect information about
incoming transactions, blocks, and peer connection requests.
Each measurement is logged to a dedicated log file together
with a local timestamp. We collected 600 GB of raw logs and
analyzed them using pandas [12] and NumPy for Python [13].
Our modifications to Geth entailed adding and adapting
roughly 1,000 lines of code. We used Geth’s default settings
except for the number of peers we can connect to, which we
set to unlimited in order to observe as much information from
the network as possible. These settings are identical to the
measurement client configuration used in Weber et al. [8],
which allows us to compare our results with theirs. Note
that, apart from the instrumentation effort and the number of
connected peers, no other changes have been made to Geth
— in particular, our client behaves like any other client in the
network and thus it is indistinguishable from any other regular
client. This is fundamental to obtain unbiased results.
The instrumented version of Geth was deployed in comput-
ing instances located in North America, Eastern Asia, Western
Europe and Central Europe. They were connected directly to
1Tools and data set available at: https://angainor.science/ethmeasure
Location CPU RAM(GB)
Bandwidth
(Gbps)
NA 4x Intel Xeon 2.3 GHz 15 8
EA 4x Intel Xeon 2.3 GHz 15 8
CE 4x Intel Xeon 2.4 GHz 8 10
WE 40x Intel Xeon 2.2 GHz 128 10
Table I: Specifications of the measurement infrastructure.
the Internet backbone with a network throughput of at least
8 GB/s. A detailed description of the specification of each
machine can be found in Table I. These specifications are well
above the minimum requirements to run an Ethereum client
so we do not expect any biases due to poor hardware perfor-
mance [14]. Each machine used the Network Time Protocol
(NTP) for clock synchronization. NTP provides offsets lesser
than 100ms in 99% of cases and lesser than 10ms in 90% of
cases [15].
Part of our study involves analyzing propagation delays
in the Ethereum network, with a particular focus on blocks.
We adapt the method proposed by Decker et al. [7], which
exclusively relies on timestamps generated by our measure-
ment nodes to compute the block propagation delay. More
precisely, we define the propagation delay of a block as the
time difference between the first observation of that block at
any instance of a measurement node and the times of arrival
on the remaining measurement nodes. Note that this is an
approximated method since (i) it does not measure the time
it takes to propagate a transaction or block from the miner
to the first measurement node that received that block; and
(ii) the accuracy of our measurements is always bounded
by the accuracy of NTP. We take this limited accuracy into
consideration whenever relevant.
We performed the measurements from April 1st 2019 to
May 2nd 2019, with each machine connected to more than 100
peers at any moment. Additionally, we did a complementary
measurement on the WE instance with the default number
of 25 peers. This measurement was meant to capture the
behavior of an Ethereum client with default settings and took
place from May 2nd to May 9th. Ethical Considerations: The
machines and Geth client we deployed follow exactly the
Ethereum protocol rules and thus have no negative impact on
the behavior of the Ethereum network. The data we collected
is publicly available to anyone that connects to the Ethereum
network and therefore it does not raise privacy concerns.
III. RESULTS
In this section, we present our measurements and discuss
the obtained results in face of our expectations and also,
whenever appropriate, how they relate to other studies. During
our one-month measurements, we collected data about 216,656
blocks (including forks) with the block numbers ranging
from 7,479,573 to 7,680,658. On top of that, we captured
21,960,051 unique transactions out of which 20,654,578 (94%)
were valid transactions included in main blocks.
Our study focuses on answering a wide set of questions that
depend on distinct, yet cross-dependent, facets of the whole
Ethereum platform. We follow a bottom-up structure.
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Figure 1: The histogram of times since the first block an-
nouncement.
A. Network Efficiency
The Ethereum network disseminates transactions and blocks
using a gossip-based protocol. If the network is slow in
disseminating transactions this means that end users will
observe a large latency in the transactions they submit to
the system. Regarding blocks, a slow block propagation has
harsher consequences, since it will lead to more forks as
miners are not aware of each other’s blocks in time. Therefore,
this section studies the efficiency of Ethereum’s network,
focusing on the propagation of blocks. More precisely, our
focus is on understanding how fast the Ethereum network
propagates blocks and on whether it generates significant
message redundancy.
1) Block and Transaction Propagation Delays: Figure 1
depicts the results for block propagation delays. The median
block propagation delay was 74ms and the average was 109ms.
The propagation delay of the 95% fastest blocks was under
211ms, and it took 317ms for 99% of blocks to propagate
through the network. This shows that blocks are propagated
several orders of magnitude below the average inter-block time
(currently 13.3s).
Regarding transaction propagation delays, we did not find
them to be affected by geographic location (results not shown
due to space constraints). There are two main factors that ex-
plain this observation: i) transactions are small and propagate
faster than blocks and within the margin of our measurement
error (§II), and ii) transactions tend to be created in a more
geographically dispersed fashion (transactions are submitted
from a large set of nodes) as opposed to blocks (where just a
few miners produce most of them).
2) Block reception redundancy: Blocks are disseminated
through two types of messages: either in the form of light
announcements (consisting of only the block’s hash) or prop-
agated directly (including both header and body). The dissemi-
nation protocol has builtin redundancy mechanisms to tolerate
faults and packet loss. However, such redundancy comes at
the cost of additional network delays and processing overhead.
Therefore, we are interested in knowing how many redundant
blocks a node with default settings receives. Because our
measurement nodes are connected to more nodes than the
default (§II), we performed a subsidiary measurement for this
metric, between May 2nd 2019 and May 9th 2019, where an
Message Type Avg. Med. Top 10% Top 1%
Announcements 2.585 2 5 7
Whole Blocks 7.043 7 10 12
Both combined 9.11 9 12 15
Table II: Redundant block receptions.
additional measurement node was connected to the default
number of peers (25). The results are depicted in Table II,
which shows that blocks are more often propagated directly
rather than via announcements. The median and mean number
of redundant block message receptions is 9.00 and 9.11,
respectively, considering both announcements and direct block
propagation messages. Even the top 1% of most redundantly
propagated blocks are received just 15 times. Eugester et
al. [16] show that, in networks with failures, it is enough for
the gossip protocol to disseminate information to a logarithmic
number of neighbors with respect to the total system size.
According to the latest estimation from [9], there are around
15,000 Ethereum peers. Therefore the measured mean of 9.11
block receptions is close to the optimal value of 10 (ln(15, 000)
≈ 9.62). This is further confirmed by the low propagation times
analyzed in §III-B.
B. Geographical Impact
We now study the impact that geographic location has on
block propagation delays. This is important because, if some
region has lower propagation delays than others, that region
has an advantage when mining new blocks, as miners will
become aware of the latest blocks faster and thus can start
mining the next block ahead of miners in other regions.
1) Geographical position influence: The Ethereum network
establishes neighboring relationships among peers based on a
random node identifier. This is independent of the geographic
location and therefore, assuming that the network capacity
(bandwidth and latency) is evenly distributed among miners,
nodes should observe similar propagation delays regardless of
their location. Regarding transaction propagation delays, we
did not find evidence that they were affected by geographic
location (results not shown for space limitations). However, we
found that block propagation delay is affected by geographic
location.
To assess this, we measured the proportion of times each
of our measurement nodes was the first to observe a new
block. The results are depicted in Figure 2. The results clearly
show that nodes located in EA are the first to receive new
blocks most of times (≈40% of times) whereas nodes in North
America are around four times less likely to observe new
blocks first. Therefore, the geographical location of nodes
affects the new block observation times and therefore miners
in EA are at an advantage. The cause of this, as we show
in the following measurement, is simply due to the fact that
several prominent mining pools operate in Asia and therefore
nodes in EA are more likely to receive new blocks first.
2) Mining pools’ location: The emergence of huge mining
pools does not only centralize mining power on a few entities,
it also centralizes (on a few geographical hot-spots) block
propagation. To overcome this, and counter the effect observed
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Figure 2: First new blocks observations with respect to geo-
graphical location. The error bars represent the experimental
error (§II).
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Figure 3: The influence of a block’s origin mining pool on the
faster propagation times to various geographical locations. In
parentheses, we show the computational power of each mining
pool during our experiment.
in the first experiment, mining pools have been known to
place gateways in several geographical locations in order to
help disseminate their blocks, without disclosing their precise
location to avoid attacks [17]. To study the impact of this, we
measure whether our geographically dispersed measurement
nodes capture blocks mined from particular mining pools
faster than from others. The results are depicted in Figure 3,
which shows first new block reception per individual mining
pool. We consider only the 15 most prominent mining pools,
since the fractions of blocks produced by the smaller pools
are insignificant. The results clearly show that the geographic
location of peers affects faster block observation from certain
pools, and indicates that the gateways of mining pools are not
evenly distributed.
C. Blockchain Efficiency
We now focus on higher level aspects of Ethereum, from the
perspective of a blockchain platform. We focus on aspects that
are important to both end users, such as transaction commit
time, and miners, such as mining empty blocks.
When an application observes a new block B, it is not safe
to immediately consider the state transition given by its trans-
actions, because there is a chance that B might be discarded
due to a fork. Thus, applications must wait for a long enough
suffix of blocks to ensure that the appearance of an alternative
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
seconds
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
transaction inclusion
3 confirmations
12 confirmations
15 confirmations
36 confirmations
Figure 4: Time for transaction inclusion and commit with 3,
12 (default), 15 and 36 block confirmations.
heavier chain, not including block B, has a small probability.
This property is known as block finality. Applications choose
the probability of chain replacement they are willing to tolerate
(i.e., the probability of a block not being final) and wait
for enough confirmation blocks to ensure that probability. In
Ethereum, it is generally accepted that applications should wait
for 12 confirmation blocks before considering a block B as
final and its transactions as committed [8], [18], [19].
1) Transaction commit time: We measured the difference
between the time when a transaction was first observed by
our measurement nodes to the time at which it was included
in a block. To determine the block confirmation time, we also
measured how much additional time it took for such a block
to be followed by different numbers of blocks in the main
chain. These are the metrics that mostly affect end users, and
they have a direct impact on user perceived latency. Figure 4
shows the times of first inclusion of transactions in a block,
and the 3-, 12-, 15-, and 36-confirmation block times. The
variants other than the regular 12-blocks case make sense for
some applications depending on their requirements regarding
block finality probability. Besides, as we discuss in §III-D, for
applications concerned with the blockchain security, waiting
just for 12 blocks might not be enough. Our measurements
revealed that the median waiting time for 12 blocks was 189
seconds whilst in 2017 it was 200 seconds [8]. The cause for
this is that the inter-block time decreased, from 14.3 seconds to
the current 13.3 seconds [20]. This is likely to be related to the
Ethereum Constantinople fork that occurred on February 2019
to decrease the inter-block time, which was slowly increasing
due to a known hard-coded difficulty bomb [21], [22].
2) Transaction reordering: The transaction creator stamps
every transaction with a monotonically increasing nonce. We
say that two transactions from the same sender were received
out of order when we first observe the transaction with the
higher nonce. Miners cannot include out-of-order transac-
tions in a block until they receive all foregoing transactions,
which implies that out-of-order receptions negatively impact
transaction commit times, as such transactions must wait
for their delayed predecessors before committing. In 2017,
6.18% out of all committed transactions were received out-
of-order [8]. In our measurements, we observed 11.54% out-
of-order committed transactions, a substantial increase. We
also observed that it takes less than 192 and 325 seconds
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Figure 5: Commit delay (sec) for transaction based on order-
ing.
for 50% and 90% of out-of-order transactions to commit. In
comparison, the median time for in-order received transactions
is less than 189 seconds and 90% of these transactions need
292 seconds or less to commit. The results are depicted in
Figure 5.
3) Empty blocks: We now focus on a set of metrics that
affect the behavior of the miners. Blocks have a maximum
number of transactions they can include and currently most
blocks are at around 80% capacity [20]. In principle, miners
are incentivized to include transactions in a block because they
collect the fees associated with each transaction. However,
miners may occasionally decide to create and propagate blocks
that include no transactions. This behavior grants them the
possibility of starting to mine earlier than other miners. This
has interesting consequences. On the one hand, miners are
penalized by not collecting transaction fees. On the other
hand, they still get the mining reward which is, on average,
considerably higher. Besides, empty blocks can be propagated
earlier, because miners do not waste time validating transac-
tions, and faster, since they become smaller due to the absence
of transactions. Overall, these constitute a perverse incentive
to mine empty blocks. As a matter of fact, empty blocks are
harmful to the network because they increase the commit time
of transactions, as transactions that could have been included
in an empty block must wait to be included in the next block.
If a dominant number of miners switched to the selfish strategy
of occasionally mining empty blocks, it would be disastrous
for the platform. To assess the impact of this, we measure
the number of empty blocks in the network, and the mining
pools from which they originate. The results reveal that 1.45%
are empty blocks (2,921 out of 201,086 total main blocks).
This significant fraction of empty blocks decreases transaction
throughput, by increasing the transaction commit delay.
Figure 6 shows the 15 biggest pools and their share of
empty blocks. Remarkably, only a small a portion of pools,
e.g. Nanopool or Miningpoolhub1, had not mined any empty
blocks during our measurement. On the other hand, more
than 25% of blocks mined by the Zhizu pool were empty,
without a single transaction. We also observed a miner whose 6
mined blocks during the experiment were all empty. Etherscan
data confirms this miner has systematically only mined empty
blocks since its account was created [20].
We can therefore conclude that the mining of empty blocks
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Figure 6: Empty blocks per mining pool.
varies substantially across mining pools, which shows that this
practice depends on the specific protocols and policies used by
each mining pool. The fact that one major mining pool resorts
to this practice frequently might show that the benefits of this
selfish behavior are relevant. This, in turn, may suggest that
this behavior may be replicated more aggressively by other
mining pools in the future, which will imply higher penalties
on the commit delay.
4) Blockchain forks: In our measurement, we were able to
observe nearly all blocks that were created on the network.
This included 485 unrecognized forks that are not reported by
popular Ethereum blockchain explorers like Etherscan [20] or
Etherchain [23].
Out of the 216,671 blocks that we captured, 92.81% of
them became part of the main chain, 6.97% became uncles
referenced by some block from the main chain and only
0.22% of the blocks became unrecognized uncles. Table III
also shows that forks of length one are the most common
(97%) and that the longest forks observed were of length
3. It also shows that forks of length one are very likely to
become recognized, i.e. referenced as uncle in some main
block. During our measurement, not a single fork longer than
1 became recognized.
Fork Length Total Recognized Unrecognized
1 15,171 15,100 71
2 404 0 404
3 10 0 10
Table III: Fork types and lengths.
Since 2017, the proportion of forked blocks increased by
more than one percent and their lengths increased as well.
Among other possible factors, it is likely that this trend reflects
the fact that mean inter-block time (the time between two
succeeding blocks) has decreased by around one second in
the last two years [20].
5) One-miner Forks: The Ethereum yellow paper defines
fork as “a disagreement between nodes as to which root-to-
leaf path down the block tree is the best blockchain” [2]. Forks
are thus expected to occur when distinct miners disagree on the
best blockchain (e.g., on distinct versions of the highest block
produced by distinct miners), but not due to a single miner
producing distinct blockchains simultaneously (e.g., distinct
versions of the highest block). Surprisingly, we find many
instances where a single miner produced several blocks at the
same height. This phenomena, which clearly was not foreseen
in the original specification, has a relevant impact today. In
fact, more than 11% of all forks consisted of a divergence
between two blocks from the same miner.
We find that miners produced 1,750 block pairs with a
unique block height. They also mined 25 triples of blocks,
once mined a 4-tuple and once a 7-tuple of such blocks. In
the case of the 4- and 7-tuples, we believe that these were
due to a mining pool partition or another pool malfunction.
In the case of a 3- and 2-tuples, there is a strong reason to
suspect of intentional behavior: these forks got recognized as
uncle blocks and thus got rewarded in 98% of the cases. This
phenomenon shows that the uncle block rewarding system,
which was intentionally meant to help less powerful miners,
is effectively helping the most powerful mining pools to
unethically profit from multiple rewards, by mining multiple
versions of the highest block in parallel.
D. Security
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Figure 7: The sequences of consecutive main blocks mined by
a unique miner.
As previously discussed, mining in Ethereum is performed
by a few mining pools that dominate the platform. Moreover,
miners are free to select which transactions to include in a
block and which to discard. This raises concerns over the
security and fairness of the network, as a mining pool might
censor transactions from a given user, or perform other attacks
such as a double-spend by reverting a suffix of the blockchain.
In Ethereum, a block B is usually considered final when
it is followed by a 12 block sequence. If a mining pool is
able to produce more than 12 blocks in row, this means that
it can effectively censor the blockchain and perform attacks
such as double-spends. A less severe attack that mining pools
can perform is to increase the latency of a given transaction
simply by refusing to include it in the sequence of blocks they
mine. This enables them to perform a temporary censorship.
To assess the security of the network, from the perspective
of block finality, we measured the length of consecutive
sequences of blocks created by the same mining pool. We were
interested in the probability of temporary censorship taking
place and for how long mining pools would be able to do
it. Our results reveal that Ethereum pools regularly have the
opportunity to temporarily censor transactions for more than
two minutes, but historically we registered events allowing for
3-minute-long censoring.
During our one-month measurement, we observed that the
prominent pools managed to mine sequences of blocks as long
as 9. The results are shown in Figure 7 which depicts the
lengths of consecutive blocks the top 5 mining pools were
able to produce. Ethermine managed to mine four 8-block long
sequences and Sparkpool was able to generate 9-block long
sequences twice.
At the time of our measurements, the accumulated computa-
tional power of all Ethermine’s miners was 25.9% of the whole
Ethereum platform [20]. Therefore, the theoretical chance of
mining a sequence of 8 consecutive blocks would be 0.2598 =
2 × 10−5. During one month, there were 201,086 blocks in
the main chain. With a theoretical chance of 2 × 10−5, this
means that Ethermine should be able to mine 8 consecutive
blocks 4 times per month (2 × 10−5 × 201, 086 ≈ 4) exactly
the value we observed. In the case of Sparkpool, which has a
theoretical chance of mining 9 consecutive blocks of 0.2269
it should take at least three months to mine such a sequence
(0.2269 × 201, 086 ≈ 0.3) however it did so twice in a month.
Since blocks were not announced all together, like in a block
withholding attack, and presented an average inter-block time,
it is unlikely that Sparkpool performed such an attack [24].
It is more likely that the current values that are used to
consider a block as final are too optimistic, given the fraction
of mining power that is currently held by mining pools. To
further justify this observation, we looked beyond our one-
month experiment, and analyzed the whole blockchain. We
observed 102, 41, 4 and 1 sequences of 10, 11, 12 and 14
consecutive blocks, respectively. The longest sequence ever
recorded, consisting of 14 blocks, was mined by Ethermine
from block height 5,899,411 to 5,899,424. We do not know
the exact computational power of Ethermine at the time, but
if we assume that it was similar to its current power (0.259)
the probability of such a long sequence would be around once
in 1,000 years.
IV. RELATED WORK
A body of work has studied decentralization, the key dis-
tinctive feature of blockchain with respect to more traditional
centralized approaches, and an important property for high
resistance against censorship of individual transactions [10],
[17], [25], [26]. Luu et. al [25] reported that around 80% of
the mining power in Ethereum resides in less than ten mining
pools, which is corroborated by our observations. Gencer et.
al [10] showed that both Bitcoin and Ethereum suffer from a
centralized mining process, due to mining pools. Miller et.
al [17] showed that 75% of the mining power in Bitcoin
resides in just 2% of the nodes. Eyal and Sirer [26] described
an attack to Bitcoin preventing decentralization, in which ra-
tional miners prefer to join the selfish miners and the resulting
colluding group becomes a majority. Our observations confirm
these hypotheses and show that Ethereum mining pools have
the power to temporarily censor transactions and harm their
commit time by mining long sequences of blocks.
Previous research has focused on the time it takes for a
transaction to commit [1], [8], [19]. Nakamoto [1] showed
the probability of not replacing a Bitcoin block B containing
transaction t with a malicious block B′ without t can be made
arbitrarily high, whereas Buterin [19] studied the correspond-
ing probability for Ethereum. In Bitcoin, the probability that is
deemed safe is achieved after 6 blocks, corresponding to one
hour, whereas in Ethereum this is achieved after 12 blocks,
corresponding to around 3 minutes [8]. In our one-month
observations we observed two instances where a single mining
pool was able to mine 9 consecutive blocks twice, and we also
observed that over all the blocks ever mined, a mining pool
was able to mine a sequence of 14 consecutive blocks. This
means that mining pools are indeed able to censor transactions
and rewrite the blockchain, and therefore should raise concerns
about the security of the network.
Previous work attempted to describe the causes of mining
empty blocks [27], [28]. In our work, we observed that 1.43%
of Ethereum blocks are empty and most mining pools mined
empty blocks, which suggests mining empty blocks pays off.
V. LESSONS LEARNED
Our experiment shed light on strengths and challenges of
the Ethereum network, while offering some surprises. The
low propagation delay we observed can be considered a
strength of the Ethereum network. In contrast, mining pool
centralization can lead to challenging and surprising selfish
behaviors. Commit delays in Ethereum have been improving
relatively to the delays reported in prior studies, which can
be mostly explained by the adoption of shorter inter-block
times in Ethereum [20]. Still, we identified selfish behaviors
that may place real threats to the throughput of the system
– most notably, empty blocks and one-miner forks. They
all represent distortions of the incentive model of Ethereum,
which encourage selfish nodes to waste system resources
(namely, mining power and network capacity) in intentional
efforts that do not contribute to the progress of the main
blockchain. To the best of our knowledge, these behaviors
were not anticipated in the original design of the system [2].
Hence, current implementations tolerate them. While our study
found relatively scarce occurrences of such selfish behaviors,
with a low impact on the overall throughput of the system,
they were observed consistently over the experiments. This
suggests that these behaviors are profitable to selfish nodes,
hence there is a risk that the frequency and impact of such
situations grows in the future.
Regarding one-miner forks, we argue that the Ethereum
protocol should forbid referencing uncles mined by miners
that have already mined a main block of the same height.
This would – as our results show – save around 1% of the
platform’s overall computational resources which are currently
spent on mining forks, while at the same time giving a higher
chance that small miners collect those rewards. The uncle
block rate of a mining pool would be effectively slowed down,
even if the mining pool tried to use distinct coin addresses
for claiming the rewards, since mining power would be split
among those addresses. Additionally, we have observed that,
in 56% of cases, mining pools appeared to be using their full
mining power for mining distinct versions of the same block
(i.e. with the same transaction set) with the same height. In
the remaining 44% of the cases, they were mining different
blocks (i.e. with distinct transaction sets) with the same height.
This means our solution would effectively deter mining pools
from using their full mining power to mine distinct versions of
the same block, in more than half of the one-miner fork cases.
Further, producing such blocks could be considered a protocol
violation and a miner could be punished by having funds
removed from his coinbase account [29]. A robust solution
to put an end to empty blocks should be designed, to prevent
them from harming the system throughput. However, this is a
challenging endeavor that is left for future work.
Our study also highlights that the emergence of mining
pools has rendered some initial design assumptions [19] obso-
lete today. Among multiple findings of our study that support
this claim, we observed that the usual 12-block confirmation
rule of Ethereum may not provide the strong probabilistic
guarantees that are promised by probabilistic analysis that
unrealistically rely on a flat and large universe of individual
miners. More concretely, we observed that the centralization
of most mining power on Ethereum has already enabled
alarmingly long sequences of consecutive blocks (lengths of
8, 9 and even 14 blocks) generated by a single mining pool.
This emphasizes that, for permissionless blockchain protocols
whose design allows mining pool-like extensions, these need
to always be considered as first-class elements of the ecosys-
tem at the earliest design stages. However, we observe that
the underlying system model considered by many research
papers that study or propose new blockchain implementations
omits mining pool organizations from their underlying system
models [7]–[9]. This common practice should be avoided by
the research community.
Our study also revealed that some key trends changed in a
short time span, such as: i) the median waiting time for 12
blocks decreased from 200 seconds to 189 seconds [8]; ii)
a substantial increase in out-of-order committed transactions
from 6.18% to 11.54% [8]; iii) the proportion of forked blocks
increased by more than 1% and fork lengths increased as
well. This confirms that large-scale permissionless blockchain
systems are eminently dynamic, and highlights the importance
of studies like ours to take place regularly. We make our tools
available to encourage this. Finally, we have systematically
confirmed that the geographical location of a node has a
consistent impact on the level of service that node gets from
the system. More than a symptom that the set of nodes is not
evenly spread across the globe, this reflects the fact that a large
portion of Ethereum’s activity now depends on a small and
poorly dispersed subset of nodes that comprises the gateways
of the major mining pools. This stresses the importance of
multi-observer measurement approaches when characterizing
permissionless blockchains, as followed by our study.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have described our experience studying the Ethereum
network from several geographically dispersed observation
points. We identified previously undocumented forms of selfish
behavior and showed that the prevalence of powerful mining
pools exacerbates the geographical impact on block propa-
gation delays. We provide a set of open measurement and
processing tools, as well as the data set of the collected
measurements, to promote further research on permissionless
blockchains.
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